Can state police officers detain suspects for federal immigration offenses and share information with ICE?

Can state police officers detain suspects for federal immigration offenses and share information with ICE?

FFENSES AND SHARE INFORMATION WITH ICE?

As a general rule, the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects people against searches by the government unless they have obtained a warrant, just witnessed criminal activity, or certain other exceptions that have been created over the years. All information or contraband that is found in violation of this rule can be suppressed as the product of an illegal search, which is why when law enforcement fails to properly obtain information and evidence the defense has a chance to use those failures to its advantage.

A recent novel issue that emerged in the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in Erick Geovany Yoc-Us v. Attorney General of the United States was a dispute over whether information obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment by state government officials can be used by the federal government in a civil hearing for immigration violations. Issues like this may determine how much information can be shared between various levels of government for civil immigration offenses and what levels of intrusion by law enforcement will be tolerated in order to collect this kind of information.

The situation leading to the arrest

The two defendants were passengers in a van that had already been pulled over and stopped by the state police in Pennsylvania for speeding. During the course of the traffic stop and following investigation, the police had suspected that the two passengers were undocumented immigrants. They had apparently made contact with the passengers and asked them to produce identification while running a check on the driver’s credentials. The state officers had also instructed the driver to pull into a rest stop area where the police vehicles blocked all paths to an exit, meaning they were formally detained for almost two hours after the initial stop.

The officers contacted ICE after realizing the passengers were undocumented and the two defendants were taken into custody, interviewed, and fingerprinted by the federal agency. At their immigration hearing, the attorneys for the defendants moved to have any information about their immigration status suppressed as it was collected in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. The immigration judge refused to exclude the evidence on the bases that (1) an immigration hearing is a civil hearing, not criminal, and (2) that previous case law related to federal agents stated that such information would only be suppressed if it was the product of reckless and widespread Fourth Amendment violations. The initial traffic stop was also a legal way for the state police to investigate a violation for speeding. However, these related cases had always dealt with federal agents as the source of a potential constitutional violation, meaning this particular set of facts had not been decided by any court before and no precedent existed.

Were their rights violated in this situation?

One thing to keep in mind is that the Fourth Amendment has mostly been used to apply to criminal prosecutions, but not for civil offenses. The stakes are often much higher when someone could be given a lengthy prison sentence rather than merely a fine or other actions taken against someone for a civil offense. However, deportation is a consequence as serious, if not more serious, than prison, which makes removal proceedings different than other civil proceedings.

The Third Circuit did not conclude whether there was or was not a Fourth Amendment violation, but resolved the immigration judge should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine if the stop included Fourth Amendment violations such as a pretextual stop based on race or other factors. The merits of the claim as to whether the evidence was collected in violation of the constitution will have to be decided by the lower court—at least at first.

Why is this important?

Primarily, because the Third Circuit held that illegal searches and seizures by state law enforcement may lead to the exclusion of evidence in immigration court.

As issues surrounding illegal immigration become a topic of increased national scrutiny and enforcement, situations involving various levels of law enforcement such as the one in this case will emerge. While this particular appellate decision only sent the case back to the lower court to seriously analyze whether the petitioners had their Fourth Amendment rights violated, other decisions with similar facts will help create a more thorough body of cases and clearly define the law in this area. Local police agencies may end up helping federal police find immigration offenses more easily if they are given leeway by the courts to detain suspects and contact ICE or other relevant federal agencies.

Ideally, there should be clear guidelines about whether various levels of state and federal agencies are able to share information about possible immigration offenses, and what kind of information will be subject to Fourth Amendment protections such as the requirement of a warrant. Practitioners in the field of immigration law will also need to stay informed of these developments and related cases to advise their clients properly.